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Abstract
In this paper, we consider situations in which individuals want to choose an action close to
others’ actions as well as close to a payoff relevant state of nature with the ideal proximity to
the common state varying across the agents. Before this coordination game with heterogeneous
preferences is played, a cheap talk communication stage is offered to players who decide to whom
they reveal the private information they hold about the state. The strategic information trans-
mission taking place in the communication stage is characterized by a strategic communication
network. We provide a direct link between players’ preferences and the strategic communication
network emerging at equilibrium, depending on the strength of the coordination motive and the
prior information structure. Equilibrium strategic communication networks are characterized
in a very tractable way and compared in term of efficiency. In general, a maximal strategic
communication network may not exist and communication networks cannot be ordered in the
sense of Pareto. However, expected social welfare always increases when the communication
network expands. Strategic information transmission can be improved when group or public
communication is allowed, and/or when information is certifiable.
Keywords: Cheap talk, coordination, partially verifiable types, public and private communi-
cation.
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1 Introduction
For social scientists, pressure to conform is a central instance of social influence. Since the work
of Jones (1984), economists have acknowledged that, in many situations, the cost of non-conformist
behavior can shape economic interactions. In the present paper, following Bernheim (1994) and
Akerlof (1997), the need for conformity is directly incorporated into individual preferences assuming
that agents can be directly penalized for departing from behaviors accepted in their social group.
In addition, the agents who have an interest in making a decision coordinated with that of others
have heterogeneous preferences toward this decision. More precisely, we analyze situations in which
individuals want to choose an action that is close to others’ actions as well as close to a payoff
relevant state of nature with the ideal proximity to this common state varying across the agents.
In the game we consider, players have access to independent sources of partial information about
the true state of nature. They choose to whom they want to transmit their private information
before playing the payoff-relevant coordination game with incomplete information. Within this
stylized framework, our main object of study is the strategic information transmission that takes
place during the communication stage preceding the decision stage. We characterize the strategic
communication between players by a strategic communication network in the sense that a connection
is formed from one individual to another if the former correctly transmits his private information to
the latter. We provide a direct link between individuals’ heterogeneous preferences and the emerging
strategic communication network, depending on the type of communication that is allowed (private,
public or group communication), the strength of the coordination motive and the prior information
structure.
The situations in which agents have different “ideal actions” but an interest in coordinating
their decisions with each other have the relevant features of many economic and social situations.
Examples of actions taken within a social group and having bad social consequences if they turn
out to be isolated include demand for education or effort towards environmental problems.1 One
can also think of financial analysts having, for one part, an interest in making predictions similar
to that of others to be credible and, for another part, heterogeneous preferences towards such an-
nouncements.2 Inside a firm, decisions should be adapted to the market conditions and information
about these conditions is often distributed among the members of the organization due to their
specialization. On the one hand, the different divisions of the organization have to coordinate their
decisions to maximize the firm’s profit, but, on the other hand, each division may be biased in its
decision because of career concerns, effort aversion or local adaptation costs.3 In a market, firms
have to take decisions, such as investment in order to launch a new product or amount of advertising
expenses, that are the most appropriate to the underlying fundamentals. In addition, such firms
may also have a “beauty contest” coordination motive arising from the strategic complementarities
in the actions of all the firms in the market considered. In all these settings, a question arises
about how players strategically share private information, and whether some physical communi-
cation links are worthless due to a lack of incentives between the sender(s) and the receiver(s) to
correctly transmit it. When social welfare increases with information transmission, one could also
1Bernheim (1994) and Akerlof (1997) consider such examples.
2Desgranges and Rochon (2007) develop this example.
3The framework of firm internal organization is adopted by Alonso, Dessein, and Matouschek (2008).
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search for communication protocols that stimulate strategic communication.
When individuals only differ in terms of knowledge, but not in term of preferences, it is the-
oretically well known how coordination and welfare is affected by the information structure, and
in particular by the public or private nature of individuals’ signals (see, e.g., Morris and Shin,
2002 and Angeletos and Pavan, 2007). The most efficient way to disseminate information about
the fundamentals can therefore be investigated. With agents’ goals aligned but physical or cost
constraints on the number of communication links between agents, another object of study is to
identify the most efficient communication structures. This problem has been analyzed in different
settings in team theory and in coordination games with incomplete information by, among others,
Marschak and Radner (1972), Radner (1993), Jehiel (1999), Chwe (2000), Calvo´-Armengol and
Mart´ı (2007a,b), and Morris and Shin (2007). A common feature of the papers cited above is that
there is no conflict of interests between agents regarding the ideal state-contingent action profile.
As a consequence, efficient networks are characterized under physical communication constraints.
On the contrary, coordination situations we are interested in involve some conflicts of interest which
is why we focus on networks arising in equilibrium under strategic communication constraints.
Since cheap talk communication is offered to players before they take their actions, our paper is
methodologically related to the literature on strategic information transmission built on Crawford
and Sobel (1982). Our model includes multiple and interdependent decision-makers, all of them
being endowed with private information, whereas most extensions of Crawford and Sobel’s sender-
receiver game with more than two players involve multiple senders (with no decision) but one
uninformed receiver.4
One exception in the literature on cheap talk with multiple receivers (and only one informed
sender) is the paper by Farrell and Gibbons (1989) and some economic and accounting applications
by Newman and Sanssing (1993), Gigler (1994), Evans and Sridhar (2002) and Levy and Razin
(2004).5 In Farrell and Gibbons’s (1989) setting, the main question addressed is whether sending
private or public messages to the receivers makes a difference. Farrell and Gibbons indeed illustrate
a situation, called mutual discipline of public communication, in which information is revealed to
neither decision-maker when communication is private but a fully revealing equilibrium is played
when communication takes place publicly. Such an effect also arises in our setting, but, contrary
to Farrell and Gibbons (1989), the receivers we consider are not independent decisionmakers whose
actions are separable in the sender’s utility function. This enables us to identify another mutual
discipline effect which is absent in Farrell and Gibbons (1989) and that we call mutual discipline
of coordination. This effect lies in the fact that, for a fix sender, when the set of his receivers gets
larger, the incentive constraints to reveal his information to the original receivers become weaker.
This implies that when the informational incentive constraints are satisfied for revealing information
to a set of receivers, these constraints are not necessarily satisfied for information revelation to a
strict subset of these receivers only. In particular, complete information revelation consisting in
every player revealing his information to the whole set of players, can be the unique informative
equilibrium.
4See, among others, Battaglini (2002), Krishna and Morgan (2001), and Ambrus and Takahashi (2008).
5Of course, several game theoretical, but more abstract, research papers deal with general cheap talk games,
but the focus is mainly on characterizing conditions under which a (mediated) communication equilibrium can be
decentralized with multilateral and multistage communication (see, e.g., the references in Forges, 2007).
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Two recent papers are closely related to the present work in that they consider incentive conflicts
over decisions and therefore endogenize communication between agents. Alonso et al. (2008) and
Rantakaraki (2006) both analyze strategic communication in a two-divisions organization in which
the decisions of the divisions must be responsive to local particularities as well as coordinated
with each other. They compare different governance structures such as Decentralization, a case
in which division managers communicate horizontally and make their respective decisions, and
Centralization, a case in which decision managers communicate vertically with an independent
headquarter who issues its decisions orders. Decision makers’ payoffs are similar to the ones we
consider but conflicts of interest regarding decisions are modeled in a different way. In Alonso et al.
(2008) and Rantakaraki (2006), each division manager has an “ideal action” that depends on an
idiosyncratic state and maximizes a weighted sum of his own division’s profit and the one of the
other division. These weights capture how biased each manager is towards his own division’s profit.
The focus is on determining the best organizational arrangement driven by these biases and by the
relative importance of coordination need.
Our model, presented in Section 2, is a n-player coordination game with continuous, one-
dimensional action spaces. As in Morris and Shin (2002) and Calvo´-Armengol and Mart´ı (2007a,b),
each player has a private signal about the fundamentals and incurs losses from a mismatch between
his action and (i) his “ideal action” given by a parameter that depends on the underlying fundamen-
tals, and (ii) others’ actions. As in Crawford and Sobel (1982) or Dessein (2002), each individual’s
ideal action is characterized by a systematic positive or negative bias. Biases vary across individuals
and the profile of biases in the population is a measure of the conflict of interests faced by agents.
Before players choose their action, they are offered a single stage to send costless messages to each
other.
In Section 3, we first characterize the unique second-stage Bayes-Nash equilibrium decisions
depending on the communication network induced by the first-stage communication strategy profile.
This enables us to compare communication networks in terms of efficiency. While communication
networks cannot be ordered in the sense of Pareto, even at the ex ante stage, expected social welfare
always increases when the communication network expands. Next, we investigate the conditions
for a communication network to be an equilibrium of the cheap talk extension of the game. In
short, the incentive constraints for some player i to reveal his type to some subset of players Ri
are satisfied when player i’s bias is close enough to the average bias of every subset of players
in Ri. Surprisingly, no maximal equilibrium network may exist meaning that there may be an
equilibrium in which player i reveals his type only to players in Ri, another equilibrium in which
he reveals his type only to players in R′i, but no equilibrium in which he reveals his type to players
in Ri ∪R
′
i. The tractable equilibrium characterization that we get also directly provides necessary
and sufficient conditions for the complete social welfare maximizing network to be an equilibrium
of the communication game.
In Section 4, the informational incentive constraints are weakened by considering other com-
munication protocols. In Section 4.1, players are required to send the same message either to all
the other players (public communication) or to a subset of these (group communication). With
such communication forms, the informational incentive constraints for player i to reveal his type
to a subset of players Ri are satisfied whenever player i’s bias is close enough to the average bias
of players in Ri, which is a weaker requirement than under private communication. Finally, in
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Section 4.2, we allow players to use messages that completely or partially certify their type. By
providing sufficient conditions for full revelation of information in this case, we extend some re-
sults from the literature on strategic information revelation by Okuno-Fujiwara, Postlewaite, and
Suzumura (1990), Seidmann and Winter (1997) and Van Zandt and Vives (2007). When types are
completely certifiable, full revelation of information is obtained whatever the type profile and the
communication protocol. On the contrary, when types are only partially certifiable, public com-
munication is again more efficient than private communication, and full revelation of information
is not guaranteed for every bias profile.
We conclude in Section 5. All proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2 Model
2.1 A Class of Coordination Games with Incomplete Information
Let N = {1, ..., n} be a finite set of agents. Each agent chooses an action ai ∈ Ai = R. The
action profile over all agents is denoted a = (a1, . . . , an). Each agent’s payoff depends on the action
profile and a state of nature θ. Before the game starts, nobody knows the state of nature, but
each agent i ∈ N receives a private signal si ∈ Si about θ. We assume that agents’ types are
independent and denote qi ∈ ∆(Si) the prior probability distribution over agent i’s set of types, for
every i ∈ N . When the type profile is s = (s1, ..., sn), the underlying state of nature is θ(s) ∈ R
and agent i’s payoff function is given by
ui(a1, ..., an; θ(s)) = −(1− α)(ai − θ(s)− bi)
2 −
α
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
(ai − aj)
2. (1)
The first component of agent i’s utility function is a quadratic loss in the distance between his
action ai and his ideal action θ(s) + bi. The second component is a miscoordination quadratic loss
which increases in the average distance between i’s action and other agents’ actions. The constant
α ∈ (0, 1) weights both sources of quadratic loss, i.e., it parameterizes agents’ coordination motives
arising from the strategic complementarity in their actions. The constant bi ∈ R parameterizes
agent i’s preference regarding his ideal action in the first component of his utility function. We
allow the bias parameter bi to vary across individuals to reflect agents’ conflict of interests with
respect to their ideal actions. If all bi were equal, there would be no informational incentive problem
and strategic information transmission would therefore be trivial.
2.2 Communication Game
Before the coordination game described below is played, but after each player has learnt his type,
a communication stage is introduced in which players can send costless and private messages to
each other. More precisely, every player i can send a different message mji ∈ Mi to every other
player j 6= i, Mi denoting the (nonempty) set of messages available to player i. Let mi = (m
j
i )j 6=i ∈
(Mi)
n−1 be the vector of messages sent by player i, and mi = (mij)j 6=i ∈
∏
j 6=iMj ≡ M−i be the
vector of messages received by player i.
In this communication game, player i’s first stage communication strategy is a profile σi =
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(σji )j 6=i with
σji : Si →Mi.
Let σji (m
j
i | si) be the probability (0 or 1) that player i sends message m
j
i to player j according
to his strategy σi when his type is si.
Player i’s second-stage decision strategy is a mapping
τi : Si × (Mi)
n−1 ×M−i → Ai,
where τi(si,mi,m
i) is the action chosen by player i when his type is si ∈ Si, he sent the vector
of private messages mi = (m
j
i )j 6=i ∈ (Mi)
n−1 and received the vector of private messages mi =
(mij)j 6=i ∈M−i. Let τ(s, (mi)i∈N ) = (τi(si,mi,m
i))i∈N be the corresponding action profile.
At the end of the communication stage, a belief system is a profile µ = (µji )i6=j , where µ
j
i :
Mj → ∆(Sj) for every i ∈ N and j 6= i. Given player j’s message m
i
j to player i, µ
j
i (sj | m
i
j) is
player i’s belief about player j’s type sj ∈ Sj.
A perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE)6 of the communication game is a strategy profile (σ, τ) =
((σi)i∈N , (τi)i∈N ) and a belief system µ satisfying the following properties:
(i) Sequential rationality in the communication stage. For all i, j ∈ N , i 6= j, and si ∈ Si,
σji (si) ∈ arg max
m
j
i∈Mi
∑
s−i∈S−i
q−i(s−i) ui
(
τ(s, (σ−i(s−i), σ
−j
i (si),m
j
i )); θ(s)
)
,
where q−i(s−i) =
∏
j 6=i qj(sj).
(ii) Sequential rationality in the action stage. For all i ∈ N , mi ∈ (Mi)
n−1 and mi ∈M−i,
τi(si,mi,m
i) ∈ arg max
ai∈Ai
∑
s−i∈S−i
µi(s−i | m
i) ui
(
(τj(sj, (σ
−i
j (sj),m
i
j), (σ
j
−i(s−i),m
j
i )))j 6=i, ai; θ(s)
)
,
where µi(s−i | m
i) =
∏
j 6=i µ
j
i (sj | m
i
j).
(iii) Belief consistency. For all i, j ∈ N , i 6= j, and mij ∈ supp[σ
i
j ],
µji (sj | m
i
j) =
σij(m
i
j | sj)qj(sj)∑
tj∈Sj
σij(m
i
j | tj)qj(tj)
.
3 Results
In this section, in order to characterize information transmission networks that emerge from the
cheap talk extension of the game as (directed) hypergraphs over the set of players, we assume that
each player i can only have two possible types, Si = {si, si} with si < si. Thus, any message
from player i to player j is either fully revealing or non-revealing, and a communication link is
6See Fudenberg and Tirole (1991). Notice that, in the cheap talk game, this definition yields the same equilibrium
outcomes as the Nash equilibrium definition, but we already require sequential rationality and belief consistency here
for consistency with the solution concept used in the case of certifiable information in Section 4.2.
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formed from i to j when i’s message to j is fully revealing. Without further loss of generality, we
can restrict ourselves to binary messages spaces, Mi = {m,m}. In addition, to get explicit and
tractable equilibrium characterizations, we assume that the state of nature is additive in types:
θ(s) =
∑
i∈N si. These assumptions on the number of types and the additivity of the state of
nature will be relaxed in Section 4.2 when focusing on the conditions for complete information
revelation (by all players to all the other players) with certifiable types.
The difference between the two possible signals of player i, si − si, is the value of the private
information for player i. When this value is high, player i’s private information has a large impact
on the fundamentals.
3.1 Second-Stage Equilibrium Characterization
With only two possible types for each player, every communication strategy profile (σi)i∈N can be
characterized by a communication network (Ri)i∈N , where, for every player i,
Ri ≡ {j ∈ N\{i} : σ
j
i (si) 6= σ
j
i (si)},
is the set of players player i completely reveals his type to. Let ri = |Ri| be the number of players
who learn player i’s type in the communication stage.
Given a profile of types (si)i∈N and a communication strategy profile characterized by (Ri)i∈N ,
the second stage equilibrium action of each player i ∈ N is uniquely given by (see Appendix 6.1),
ai =
∑
j∈Ii
α(n− 1− rj)E(sj) + (1− α)(n − 1)sj
n− 1− αrj
+
∑
j∈Ii
E(sj)
+
[(n− 1)− (n− 2)α]bi + α
∑
j 6=i bj
n+ α− 1
,
(2)
where Ii = {k : i ∈ Rk} ∪ {i} is the set of signals which are known by player i after the communi-
cation stage, and Ii = {k : i 6∈ Rk}\{i} is the set of signals which are unknown by player i after
the communication stage.
Hence, i’s optimal action has three components. The first component is a weighted sum of j’s
actual type, sj, and the expected value of j’s type, E(sj), for each player j whose type is known
by player i (including himself). Note that more relative weight is put on the actual type of player
j when the coordination motive, α, is low and when the number of players who know j’s type, rj,
is high. The second component corresponds to the sum of the expected values of j’s type for each
player j whose type is unknown by player i. The last component adjusts the action of player i with
respect to the bias profile. It is increasing with all players biases, with more relative weight being
put on player i’s own bias, bi, when the coordination motive decreases.
This explicit characterization of second-stage equilibrium actions as a function of the informa-
tion structure and players’ preference allows us to characterize in a very tractable way the efficient
and equilibrium communication strategy profiles, as shown in the following subsections.
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3.2 Efficient Networks
The next proposition compares players’ ex ante expected payoffs when the communication network
that arises from the communication stage expands, assuming that equilibrium actions are played
in the second-stage game.7 While an increase in the set of receivers who learn player i’s type is
always strictly beneficial for player i and for these receivers, such an increase makes players who
don’t learn player i’s type always strictly worse off.
Proposition 1 Consider two communication networks R = (Ri, R−i) and R
′ = (R′i, R−i) such
that Ri ( R
′
i.
i) Player i is strictly better off, ex-ante, with the communication network R′ than with the
communication network R;
ii) Every player j ∈ R′i (with j ∈ Ri or j /∈ Ri) is strictly better off, ex-ante, with the
communication network R′ than with the communication network R;
iii) Every player j ∈ N\({i}∪R′i) is strictly worse off, ex-ante, with the communication network
R′ than with the communication network R.
Proof. See Appendix 6.2.
This result implies that, in general, communication networks cannot be ordered in the sense
of Pareto, except the complete communication network (Ri = N\{i} for all i ∈ N) that Pareto
dominates every other network.
The next proposition shows, however, that the overall effect of an increase in information trans-
mission is positive. We define the social welfare as the sum of individual utilities,
∑
i∈N ui(a; θ),
and consider that a communication network R′ = (R′i)i∈N is larger than a communication network
R = (Ri)i∈N when Ri ⊆ R
′
i for all i ∈ N (with at least one strict inclusion).
Proposition 2 The welfare is always strictly larger, ex-ante, with the communication network R′
than with the communication network R if R′ is larger than R.
Proof. See Appendix 6.3.
3.3 Equilibrium Networks
The next proposition provides a complete characterization of communication networks that may
arise as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome of the cheap talk extension of the game. The
proposition tells us that, in equilibrium, player i transmits his information to a set of players
Ri ⊆ N\{i} if player i’s bias is close enough to the average bias of the players who belong to every
subset of players in Ri.
Proposition 3 There exists a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which every player i completely
reveals his private information to every player in Ri ⊆ N\{i} iff for all i ∈ N and R
′
i ⊆ Ri, with
7As in Crawford and Sobel (1982), it is not possible to compare players’ expected payoffs at the interim stage.
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|R′i| = r
′
i, we have ∣∣∣∣∣bi −
∑
j∈R′i
bj
r′i
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ (n− 1 + α)(n − 1− αr
′
i)
2(n − 1)(n − 1− αri)
(si − si). (3)
Proof. See Appendix 6.4.
The condition for player i to transmit his information to players in Ri does not depend on
the communication strategies used by players different from i, which highly simplifies the analysis.
As it can be seen from the threshold on the RHS of Inequality (3), this condition for information
transmission is weaker when the weight on coordination motives, α, increases,8 when the value of
player i’s private information, si−si, increases, and when the total number of players, n, decreases.
9
From the previous proposition, a corollary is deduced that gives the necessary and sufficient
condition for the efficient communication network, the complete one, to be an equilibrium of the
communication game.
Corollary 1 There is a fully revealing equilibrium, characterized by the complete communication
network, if and only if for all i ∈ N and Ri ⊆ N\{i},∣∣∣∣bi −
∑
j∈Ri
bj
ri
∣∣∣∣ ≤ (n− 1 + α)(n − 1− αri)2(n − 1)2(1− α) (si − si). (4)
As an illustration, consider a game with n = 4 players and α = 1/2. To start with, we examine
the incentives for information transmission of some player i ∈ N whose value of private information
is si− si =
12×3
7 , with a null bias bi = 0. Then, the RHS of Equation (3) in Proposition 3 simplifies
to 3
6−r′i
6−ri
. It follows that player i reveals his type to all the other players if for all k, l ∈ N\{i},
∣∣∣∣
∑
j 6=i bj
3
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 3,
∣∣∣∣bk + bl2
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 4, and |bk| ≤ 5. (5)
Similarly, player i reveals his type only to players in {j, k} ( N\{i} if∣∣∣∣bj + bk2
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 3, and |bj |, |bk| ≤ 3.75. (6)
Finally, player i reveals his type only to player j 6= i if |bj | ≤ 3.
Consider the bias profile b = (−4.1, 0, 3.8, 4.1). Then, the only informative equilibrium strategy
for player i = 2 is to reveal his type to players in R2 = {1, 3, 4}. This illustrates that there may
be no equilibrium in which player 2 transmits his information to any strict subset of R2 only, but
there may be an equilibrium in which player 2 transmits his information to all players in R2. More
generally, we observe an effect that we call mutual discipline of coordination, reflecting the fact
that information transmission from some player to another one depends on whether the former’s
information is also transmitted to some other players or not. Indeed, the conditions of Proposition 3
8The RHS of Equation (3) is increasing in α because ∂
∂α
(n−1−αr′
i
)
(n−1−αri)
=
(n−1)(ri−r
′
i
)
(n−1−αri)
2 ≥ 0.
9The RHS of Equation (3) is decreasing in n since the sign of its derivative with respect to n is 2α(n − 1)r′i −
α
2
rir
′
i − (n− 1)
2(ri + 1− r
′
i), which is always negative.
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on the proximity between i’s bias and the average bias of the strict subsets R′i ( Ri of receivers
become weaker as the set of all receivers, Ri, increases. This effect is absent in Farrell and Gibbons
(1989) where the payoff of each decisionmaker only depends on his own action, while in our model
players want to coordinate their actions.
Despite this positive effect on information transmission to larger sets of receivers, a maximal
equilibrium communication network may not exist. To see this, consider the bias profile b′ =
(0, 2.2, 3.2, 3.7). Then, there is an equilibrium in which player i = 1 reveals his type to R1 = {2, 3}
and an equilibrium in which he reveals his type to R˜1 = {2, 4}, but there is no equilibrium in
which player 1 reveals his type to players in R1 ∪ R˜1 = {2, 3, 4}. More generally, when there is an
equilibrium in which some player i transmits his information to Ri and an equilibrium in which he
transmits his information to R˜i, a sufficient condition to get an equilibrium in which player i also
transmits his information to Ri ∪ R˜i is that Ri and R˜i do not overlap.
By looking at the overlapping of the conditions under which a communication strategy is an
equilibrium one, further observations can be deduced from Proposition 3 on the way agents can
be connected at equilibrium. For instance, assuming without loss of generality that players are
numbered so that their biases are arranged in increasing order, the condition that must be satisfied
so that a player completely reveals his private information to a single other player enables to deduce
what follows: if there exists an equilibrium in which player i transmits his information to a single
player k, then there is also an equilibrium in which player i transmits his information to Ri, for
all Ri ⊆ {i + 1 . . . , k − 1, k} with k > i. One could also note that the directed connection that is
built from player i to player k, when player i transmits his private information to player k, can be
reciprocal, in the sense that there also exists an equilibrium in which player k reveals his information
to player i, if players i and k both have the same value of information, i.e., s¯i − si = s¯k − sk.
It is also easy to examine the whole strategic communication networks that can arise in the
previous 4-player example. In the two strategic communication networks represented in Figure 1
below, every arrow departing from a player i corresponds to player i’s unique equilibrium commu-
nication strategy that is informative. Players who belong to the same set of receivers appear in the
same dotted box (for clarity, singletons are not drawn). Information revelation from player i to a
set of receivers Ri is represented by an arrow from i to Ri. In the example of Figure 1 (a), the value
of private information is the same for every player i ∈ N and equal to si−si =
12×3
7 . Then, with the
bias profile b, the most informative strategic communication network is R = (∅, {1, 3, 4}, {4}, {3}).
In this network, players 3 and 4 form a completely linked pair of players for who information
revelation in reciprocal whereas player 1 has no informative equilibrium communication strategy.
Interestingly, player 2 reveals his type to the set of all other players but there is no player who
transmits his information to him in equilibrium. In the example of Figure 1 (b), the values of pri-
vate information are s1− s1 =
12×12
7×5 , s2− s2 =
12×6
7×5 , s3− s3 =
12×3
7×5 and s4− s4 =
12
7×5 . Then, with
the bias profile b′, the most informative strategic communication network is R′ = ({2}, {3}, {4}, ∅).
In this network, information revelation is never reciprocal which is due to the differences in the
players’ values of private information.
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(a) (b)
2
3 41 1 2 3 4
Figure 1: Most informative strategic communication networks in two examples.
4 Extensions
Since larger communication networks are always beneficial in terms of welfare, we now investigate
how other types of (strategic and decentralized) communication extensions of the game may allow
more effective information transmission than private cheap talk. In this section we first show
how communication can be improved by considering group communication, where each player i is
required to send the same message to all players in a group R¯i ⊆ N\{i}. This includes as a particular
case public communication, where R¯i = N\{i} for all i ∈ N . In the second subsection we show that,
even when the conditions for a fully revealing equilibrium to exist in the private or public cheap talk
case are not satisfied, complete information revelation becomes possible whatever the bias profile
and the communication protocol (public or private) when players are able to completely certify their
types. When types can only be partially certified, the condition for complete information revelation
depends again on the communication protocol and the bias profile, but not on the magnitude of
players’ biases.
4.1 Public and Group Communication
It is well known since Farrell and Gibbons (1989) that the credibility of a sender’s claim may
radically depend on whether this claim has been made publicly or privately. In our model, in order
to investigate how players’ incentives to transmit their information is affected by the communication
protocol, we consider group communication games in which each player is required to send the same
message to a fixed subset of players.
Formally, in the public communication game, each player i’s communication strategy is simply
a mapping σi : Si → Mi, where σi(si) is the message publicly observed by all players in N\{i}
when player i’s type is si. When there is more than two potential audiences, each player i may
also be required to send the same message to a subset R¯i of players in N\{i}, for i = 1, . . . , n.
This communication extension of the game is called the group R¯-communication game, where
R¯ = (R¯i)i∈N . In this game, each player i’s communication strategy is a mapping σi : Si → Mi,
where each player i is required to send the same message σi(si) = mi ∈Mi to all players in R¯i.
The definition of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium for the group (and public) communication
games is similar to the definition for the private communication game. When focusing on equilib-
rium outcomes in which each player i fully reveals his type to the subset of players R¯i, the only
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difference between the group and private communication protocols is that the informational incen-
tive constraints are weaker in the former one: the only possible deviation from a common message
sent to players in R¯i is to jointly lie to all of them, while player i can choose to lie to any subset of
R¯i when the messages are private.
Proposition 4 In the group R¯-communication game, there exists a perfect Bayesian equilibrium
in which every player i completely reveals his private information to every player in R¯i ⊆ N\{i}
iff for all i ∈ N , Inequality (3) holds for all i ∈ N , with R′i = R¯i.
Proof. See Appendix 6.4.
In particular, in the public communication game, there is a fully revealing equilibrium if and
only if for all i ∈ N , ∣∣∣∣bi −
∑
j 6=i bj
n− 1
∣∣∣∣ ≤ (n− 1 + α)2(n− 1) (si − si). (7)
Notice that if there is an equilibrium in which player i transmits his information to players in
Ri in the private communication game, then there is also a group communication game with an
equilibrium in which player i transmits his information to players in Ri. In particular, the set of
all private strategic communication networks is included (and may be strictly included) in the set
of all group strategic communication networks. This is a generalization of the mutual discipline
effect of public communication observed by Farrell and Gibbons (1989, Proposition 1).
As an illustration, consider again the 4-player example of Section 3, with si−si =
12×3
7 and bi =
0. We have seen that player i reveals his type to all the other players in private if for all k, l ∈ N\{i},
all conditions of Inequality (5) are satisfied. On the contrary, under public communication, only
the first inequality of (5) is required. Similarly, in the group {j, k}-communication game, player i
reveals his type to players in {j, k} whenever the first inequality of Equation (6) is satisfied. Hence,
there is a mutual discipline effect of group communication if, e.g., b1 ∈ (−9,−5) and b3 = b4 = −b1,
since in that case there is no informative equilibrium from player i = 2 in private, while under group
communication there are equilibria in which player 2 reveals his type to players in R2 = {1, 3, 4},
R2 = {1, 3} or R2 = {1, 4} (but not R2 = {3, 4}). Finally, using the same example as under private
communication, it can be seen that a maximal equilibrium communication network may not exist
even under group communication.
4.2 Certifiable Information
In this section we extent our communication game by allowing the set of messages available to
each player to depend on his private information. Following the terminology of Grossman (1981),
Milgrom (1981), Green and Laffont (1986), Okuno-Fujiwara et al. (1990), Bull and Watson (2004),
Forges and Koessler (2005) or Giovannoni and Seidmann (2007), this means that players are able
to provide hard, verifiable, or certifiable information about their type.
Formally, the model is equivalent to the cheap talk model analyzed in section 2, except that
each player i can send messages inMi(si), whereMi(si) 6= ∅ is a type dependent set of messages. In
this subsection, the set of types Si of player i is any finite set, and the function θ(s) is not required
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to be additive in types anymore; we only assume that it is weakly increasing with si for all i ∈ N .
Without further loss of generality, assume that types in Si ⊂ R are increasingly ordered.
The communication game and perfect Bayesian equilibria are defined as in Section 2 except
that the belief consistency condition (iii) on page 6 is stronger. For all i, j ∈ N , i 6= j, and for all
sj ∈ Sj , we have the following additional condition: µ
j
i (sj | m
i
j) = 0 if m
i
j /∈Mj(sj). In addition, in
the public communication game,10 condition B(iv) in Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, p. 334) requires
common belief even off the equilibrium path, i.e., µji (·) = µ
j(·) for all i, j ∈ N , i 6= j.
We say that type si ∈ Si is certifiable if there exists a message ci(si) ∈ Mi ≡
⋃
ti∈Si
Mi(ti)
such that M−1i (ci(si)) ≡ {ti ∈ Si : ci(si) ∈ Mi(ti)} = {si}. The following proposition shows that
whatever the communication protocol (public or private), if every player can certify his type, then
there exists a fully revealing equilibrium in which all players reveal their type to all the other
players.
Proposition 5 Whatever the communication protocol (public or private) and the bias profile,
(bi)i∈N , if each type of each player is certifiable, then the communication game has a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium which is fully revealing.
Proof. See Appendix 6.5.
This proposition extends the results of the literature in several aspects. First, in Okuno-
Fujiwara et al. (1990), the class of n-person games with n > 2 is restricted to the following class of
linear-quadratic utility functions for player i:11
ai[βi(s)− d
∑
j 6=i
aj − ai], (8)
where d ∈ (0, 2) and βi(s1, . . . , sn) is increasing with si and decreasing with s−i. Developing the
utility function in our model (see Equation (1)) we get instead (minus a constant):
ai[2(1 − α)(θ(s) + bi) +
2α
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
aj − ai]−
α
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
(aj)
2. (9)
Equation (9) cannot be rewritten as Equation (8) for three important reasons:
1. In our model, βi(s) = 2(1 − α)(θ(s) + bi), which is increasing with sj for all j ∈ N ;
2. Our model involves strategic complementarities because d = − 2α
n−1 is negative, while Okuno-
Fujiwara et al. (1990) assume strategic substitutes (d > 0);
3. Equation (9) contains the additional term − α
n−1
∑
j 6=i(aj)
2 which is absent from Equa-
tion (8).12
10We do not consider the other group communication games here since we obtain full revelation of information (a
complete communication network) in both the private and public settings.
11Like us, they consider finite sets of types and assume that players’ types are independent.
12This term does not modify the second stage equilibrium strategies but may affect players’ incentives to commu-
nicate.
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Second, Van Zandt and Vives (2007) also prove the existence of a fully revealing equilibrium
in a class of games with strategic complementarities, but they assume that each player’s utility
function is increasing in the actions of the other players. This assumption of positive externalities
in actions is clearly not satisfied in our model.
Third, our proposition shows that full revelation of information holds in the public and private
communication games while Okuno-Fujiwara et al. (1990) and Van Zandt and Vives (2007) only
consider public communication.
Finally, with the exception of some sender-receiver games considered, e.g, by Seidmann and
Winter (1997), fully revealing equilibria found in the literature are usually robust to a simple
inference that either always puts probability one on the lowest type consistent with the sender’s
report, or always puts probability one on the highest type. Here, as shown in Appendix 6.5, to
support full revelation of information, the form of players’ beliefs off the equilibrium path depends
on the parameters of the game (the profile of biases (b1, . . . , bn)), on the player who deviates, and
on the players who observe this deviation (which depends on whether the communication game is
public or private). More precisely, in the private communication game, when player j receives a
private message mji from player i and his bias is higher than player i’s bias (bj ≥ bi), then his belief
off the equilibrium path consists in believing that player i’s type is the highest type compatible
with i’s message (i.e., player j believes that player i’s type is max{ti ∈ Si : m
j
i ∈ Mi(ti)}). On
the contrary, when player j’s bias is lower than player i’s bias, then he believes the lowest type
compatible with i’s message. In the public communication game, players’ inferences depend on
whether the bias of the player who deviates is lower or higher than the average bias b =
∑
i∈N bi/n.
When b ≥ bi, players in N\{i} believe the highest type compatible with player i’s report, and when
b ≤ bi they believe the lowest type.
The last observation has implications on the certifiability requirements for complete information
revelation.
Proposition 6 (Fully revealing equilibrium with partially certifiable types)
In the public communication game, if each player i with a lower bias than the average bias (i.e.,
bi ≤ b) can certify whatever his actual type si that his type is at most si (i.e., there exists mi ∈Mi
such that si = maxM
−1
i (mi)), and if each player i with a higher bias than the average bias (i.e.,
bi ≥ b) can certify whatever his actual type si that his type is at least si (i.e., there exists mi ∈Mi
such that si = minM
−1
i (mi)), then there is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium which is fully revealing.
In the private communication game, if each player i with the lowest bias (i.e., bi ≤ bj for all
j ∈ N) can certify whatever his actual type si that his type is at most si, if each player i with the
highest bias (i.e., bi ≥ bj for all j ∈ N) can certify whatever his actual type si that his type is at
least si, and the other players can completely certify their types, then there is a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium which is fully revealing.
Hence, as in the cheap talk case, the sufficient conditions for full information revelation are
stronger in the private than in the public communication game. As in the cheap talk game, this is
because in the public communication game, less deviations in the communication stage are possible.
It is however important to notice that, on the other hand, when communication is private, different
receivers can make different inferences from the same deviation, while in the public communication
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game belief consistency requires all receivers to make the same inferences. These two differences
between public and private communication are exactly to potential sources of “mutual discipline”
(full information revelation in public but not in private) in the cheap talk game of Farrell and
Gibbons (1989) and of “mutual subversion” (full information revelation in private but not in public)
in the corresponding information certification game of Koessler (2007). Here, mutual subversion is
never possible, and when types of completely certifiable, mutual discipline is also impossible since
full revelation of information always occurs in both the public and private cases. However, mutual
discipline is again possible with partially certifiable information, as shown in the next example.
More precisely, the example gives a simple instance where Proposition 6 applies for the public
communication game but there is no fully revealing equilibrium in the private one.
Consider indeed a 3-player game in which only player 1 knows the state θ ∈ {θ1, θ2, θ3}, players’
biases satisfy b2 ≤ b1 ≤ b3 and b1 ≤
b2+b3
2 , and the messages available to player 1 depending on the
state are:
M(θ1) = {m1,m2,m3}, M(θ2) = {m2,m3}, M(θ3) = {m3}.
By Proposition 6, these assumptions imply that there exists a fully revealing equilibrium in the
public communication. Hence, in equilibrium, players’ actions in state θ are given by
ai(θ) = θ +
3bi +
∑
j 6=i bj
5
.
Consider now the fully revealing communication strategy in the private communication game.
When the real state is θ1 and player 1 deviates by sending message m2 instead of m1 to player 2
(without deviating towards player 3), his best response is to choose action a′1 =
2(θ1+b1)+a2(θ2)+a3(θ1)
4 =
3θ1+θ2
4 +
3b1+b2+b3
5 . After some simplifications, the condition for this deviation to be profitable for
player 1 is
b1 − b2 >
15(θ2 − θ1)
16
.
Hence, under this condition there is no fully revealing equilibrium in the private communication
game, while a fully revealing equilibrium exists in the public one whatever the distance between
the possible fundamentals and the distance between player 1 and player 2’s biases (as long as
b1 ≤
b2+b3
2 ).
5 Conclusion
In our cheap talk game, information on a common state of nature is dispersed among some players.
These players must choose an action by balancing the benefit of choosing it close to their “ideal
action”, depending on the state and on an idiosyncratic bias, with that of choosing actions close
to each other. In such a setting, we investigate the way individuals’ heterogeneity affects strategic
information transmission that takes place during a cheap talk stage offered to players before they
take a decision. We first show that expected social welfare always increases when communication
expands but that communication networks cannot be ordered in the sense of Pareto even at the ex
ante stage. Next, we provide conditions on the proximity of players’ biases to get every possible
communication structure as an equilibrium of the cheap talk game and extend results to commu-
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nication protocols that enable larger networks to emerge under weaker conditions, namely the use
of group communication and/or certifiable messages.
In this paper, the game through which networks are built is completely different from usual
non-cooperative network formation games starting with Jackson and Wolinsky (1996).13 In such
games, every player’s strategy consists in listing wished contacts whereas we derive connections
from the equilibrium strategy profiles of different communication games. A common point of both
network formation approaches lies in the fact that nodes are players whose payoff depends on
the communication network effectively formed. Since it is now largely admitted that much of the
information useful to economic and social decision making (information about job opportunities,
state of the market, environment of the firms, . . . ) is exchanged via networks of relationships, gains
associated to network structures are often interpreted in term of information. In network formation
games a` la Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), agents create links to maximize their utility with the
informational costs and benefits of direct and indirect connections being usually exogenous. On
the contrary, we explicitly formalize the information structure and the way a player benefits from
informing or being informed is endogenously given by the equilibrium outcome of the decision stage.
When information flows through networks of relationships instead of via centralized institutions,
it makes sense to assume that agents cannot commit to private information revelation. Whether
information will effectively be transmitted once the link is formed is therefore not ensured. Our
model makes it possible to analyze the incentives to misrepresent or hide information that circulates
through network links. We consider effective strategic communication between players as a central
feature when examining the creation of communication links between them.
During the past decade, the theory of network formation has been a very active area of research
and most of the existing literature focuses on homogeneous player models.14 Only recently, the
role of ex-ante asymmetries among the players in shaping the architecture of networks has been
investigated. Arguing that such asymmetries appear in many natural contexts, Galeotti, Goyal,
and Kamphorst (2006) propose a general model of network formation in which players are heteroge-
neous with respect to their benefits and costs of forming links. We also approach network formation
considering heterogeneous players and provide a tractable link between players’ heterogeneity and
the emerging network structures. Precisely, in our framework, one main result is that agents are
more prone to communicate (or, equivalently, to link) when their ideal actions present some align-
ments. It is interesting to note that, in social sciences, homophily is a well-documented tendency
of individuals to associate with similar others (see McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook, 2001 for
an extensive review paper). In particular, this pervasive social fact implies that communication is
more likely to take place between agents whose individual characteristics are related, in the sense
that their goals are also similar.
13See Jacskon (2007) for an extensive survey of such models.
14See, among others, Bala and Goyal (2000), Dutta and Jackson (2000) and Watts (2001).
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6 Appendix
6.1 Second-Stage Equilibrium Characterization
First, we characterize the unique equilibrium action profile under complete information. The best
response of each player i to a−i solves
∂ui(ai,a−i;θ)
∂ai
= 0, i.e.,
ai(a−i; θ) = (1− α)(θ + bi) +
α
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
aj . (10)
If ai is a best response to a−i, then it follows from Equations (9) and (10) that player i’s utility
takes the following simple form (minus a constant):
ui(ai(a−i; θ), a−i; θ) = (ai(a−i; θ))
2 −
α
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
(aj)
2. (11)
The system of equations formed by Equation (10) leads to:


a1
...
...
an

 =


1 − α(n−1) · · · −
α
(n−1)
− α(n−1)
. . .
. . .
...
...
. . .
. . . − α(n−1)
− α(n−1) · · · −
α
(n−1) 1


︸ ︷︷ ︸
I
−1

(1− α1)(θ + b1)
...
...
(1− αn)(θ + bn)

 .
Simple algebra yields:
I−1 =
1
(n− 1)− (n− 2)α− α2


(n− 1)− (n− 2)α α · · · α
α
. . .
. . .
...
...
. . .
. . . α
α · · · α (n− 1)− (n− 2)α

 .
Therefore, when every player knows the state of nature, the equilibrium actions are given by:
ai(θ) = θ +
[(n− 1)− (n− 2)α]bi + α
∑
j 6=i bj
n+ α− 1
≡ θ +Bi, for every i ∈ N . (12)
Since players’ best responses are linear, exactly the same algebra shows that, under incomplete
information and whatever the information structure generated by the communication strategy
profile, expected equilibrium actions are uniquely characterized by
E(ai) = E(θ) +Bi, for every i ∈ N, (13)
so that an equilibrium strategy for player i is always linear with respect to the signals {sj}j∈Ii known
by player i after the communication stage, for i ∈ N . Uniqueness of the Bayes-Nash equilibrium can
be proved exactly as in the proof of Theorem 1 in Calvo´-Armengol and Mart´ı (2007b, pp. 25–26),
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that uses a sufficient condition for uniqueness in Radner (1962), with the potential
V (a1, ..., an) = −(1− α)
n∑
i=1
(ai − θ − bi)
2 −
α
2(n− 1)
n∑
i=1
∑
j 6=i
(ai − aj)
2, (14)
and exactly the same matrix of cross derivatives that does not depend on the bias profile.
By explicitly solving some particular incomplete information situations as above, it is possible
to guess the general form of the unique second-stage equilibrium actions. To check that the so-
lution given by Equation (2) is indeed the equilibrium when the communication strategy profile
is characterized by (Ri)i∈N , fix some player l ∈ N and suppose that the second stage equilibrium
action of every player i 6= l is given by Equation (2). We show that player l’s best response to the
profile of second stage actions (ai)i6=l also takes the form of Equation (2).
After the communication stage, for all i ∈ N , recall that Ii = {k : i ∈ Rk} ∪ {i} is the set of
players whose signals are known by player i, Ii = {k : i 6∈ Rk}\{i} the set of players whose signals
are unknown by player i, and let Ei(·) = E(· | {sl : l ∈ Ii}) be player i’s expectation operator
conditional to the set of signals that he knows.
The expected payoff of player l after the communication stage takes the following form:
−(1− α)El
[
(al −
∑
j∈N
sj − bl)
2
]
−
α
n− 1
∑
j 6=l
El
[
(al − aj)
2
]
, (15)
so his best-response is given by:
al = (1− α)

∑
j∈Il
sj +
∑
j∈Il
E(sj) + bl

+ α
n− 1
∑
j 6=l
El(aj). (16)
Using Equation (2) for i 6= l, player l’s conditional expectation of player i’s action is given by:
El(ai) =
∑
j∈Ii
α(n− 1− rj)E(sj)
n− 1− αrj
+
∑
j∈Ii∩Il
(1− α)(n − 1)sj
n− 1− αrj
+
∑
j∈Ii∩Il
(1− α)(n − 1)E(sj)
n− 1− αrj
+
∑
j∈Ii
E(sj) +Bi.
Summing over all agents different from l, we can write:∑
i6=l
El(ai) =
=
∑
i6=l
∑
j∈Ii∩Il
α(n − 1− rj)E(sj)
n− 1− αrj
+
∑
i6=l
∑
j∈Ii∩Il
α(n− 1− rj)E(sj)
n− 1− αrj
+
∑
i6=l
∑
j∈Ii∩Il
(1− α)(n − 1)sj
n− 1− αrj
+
∑
i6=l
∑
j∈Ii∩Il
(1− α)(n − 1)E(sj)
n− 1− αrj
+
∑
i6=l
∑
j∈Ii∩Il
E(sj) +
∑
i6=l
∑
j∈Ii∩Il
E(sj) +
∑
i6=l
Bi. (17)
Every signal sj known by player l is known by rj players different from l and unknown by n−1−rj
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players different from l; every signal sj unknown by player l is known by rj + 1 players different
from l and unknown by n− 2− rj players different from l. This enables to deduce:
∑
i6=l
El(ai) =
∑
j∈Il
rj
α(n − 1− rj)E(sj)
n− 1− αrj
+
∑
j∈Il
(rj + 1)
α(n − 1− rj)E(sj)
n− 1− αrj
+
∑
j∈Il
rj
(1− α)(n − 1)sj
n− 1− αrj
+
∑
j∈Il
(rj + 1)
(1− α)(n − 1)E(sj)
n− 1− αrj
+
∑
j∈Il
(n− 1− rj) E(sj) +
∑
j∈Il
(n− 2− rj) E(sj) +
∑
i6=l
Bi. (18)
In addition, we have:
∑
i6=l
Bi =
α(n − 1)bl + (n− 1)
∑
i6=l bi
n+ α− 1
. (19)
Plugging (19) and (18) into (16) and simplifying, we get player l’s optimal action, which takes
exactly the same form as in Equation (2).
6.2 Proof of Proposition 1
The ex ante equilibrium payoff of player j ∈ N is given by:
Uj = −(1− α)V (aj −
∑
i∈N
si − bj)− (1− α)[E(aj −
∑
i∈N
si − bj)]
2
−
α
n− 1
∑
m6=j
V (aj − am)−
α
n− 1
∑
m6=j
[E(aj − am)]
2.
It follows from (13) that E(aj) =
∑
i∈N E(si) +Bj, so we get:
Uj = −(1− α)V (aj −
∑
i∈N
si)−
α
n− 1
∑
m6=j
V (aj − am)− (1− α)[Bj − bj]
2 −
α
n− 1
∑
m6=j
[Bj −Bm]
2.
We consider two communication networks R = (Rk)k∈N and R
′ = (R′k)k∈N such that Ri =
R′i\{t} and Rk = R
′
k for all k ∈ N\{i}. That is, R and R
′ are the same except that player i has one
additional receiver (player t) in R′. Players i and t are fixed throughout the analysis. We denote
|Ri| = ri and |R
′
i| = r
′
i = ri + 1. The ex ante equilibrium payoff of every player j ∈ N with the
communication network R (R′, resp.) is denoted Uj (U
′
j , resp.). Given the communication network
R (R′, resp.), the second stage equilibrium action of every player j ∈ N is denoted aj (a
′
j , resp.).
For all j ∈ N , given a strategic communication network R (R′, resp.), let Ij = {k : j ∈ Rk} ∪ {j}
(I ′j = {k ∈ N : j ∈ R
′
k} ∪ {j}, resp.) denote the set of players whose signals are known by player
j, and Ij = {k : j 6∈ Rk}\{j} (I ′j = {k : j 6∈ R
′
k}\{j}, resp.) the set of players whose signals are
unknown by player j.
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For every player j ∈ N , we have:
Uj−U
′
j = (1−α)
(
V (a′j −
∑
i∈N
si)− V (aj −
∑
i∈N
si)
)
+
α
n− 1

∑
m6=j
V (a′j − a
′
m)−
∑
m6=j
V (aj − am)

 .
(20)
The second-stage equilibrium action aj given by (2) enables to write:
V (aj −
∑
i∈N
si) = V

∑
l∈Ij
α(n − 1− rl)[E(sl)− sl]
n− 1− αrl
+
∑
l∈Ij
[E(sl)− sl] +Bj

 .
The independence of signals yields:
V (aj −
∑
i∈N
si)
=
∑
l∈Ij
V
(
α(n− 1− rl)sl
n− 1− αrl
)
+
∑
l∈Ij
V (sl) =
∑
l∈Ij
(
α(n− 1− rl)
n− 1− αrl
)2
V (sl) +
∑
l∈Ij
V (sl)
=
∑
l∈Ij\{i}
(
α(n − 1− rl)
n− 1− αrl
)2
V (sl) +
∑
l∈Ij\{i}
V (sl) + V (si)
(
1[i ∈ Ij]
(
α(n − 1− ri)
n− 1− αri
)2
+ 1[i ∈ Ij ]
)
,
where 1[i ∈ Ij ] is the indicator function that equals 1 when player j knows the signal si and 1[i ∈ Ij]
is the indicator function that equals 1 when player j does not know the signal si. A similar equation
holds for V (a′j −
∑
i∈N si), when the communication network is R
′.
The two communication networks R and R′ that we consider are such that Ij\{i} = I
′
j\{i} and
Ij\{i} = I ′j\{i}, so for all j ∈ N , we have:
V (a′j −
∑
i∈N
si)− V (aj −
∑
i∈N
si) = V (si)(
1[i ∈ I ′j ]
(
α(n − 1− r′i)
n− 1− αr′i
)2
+ 1[i ∈ I ′j]− 1[i ∈ Ij]
(
α(n− 1− ri)
n− 1− αri
)2
− 1[i ∈ Ij]
)
.
(21)
When the communication network is R, for all j ∈ N and m 6= j, we have, from (2):
V (aj − am) =
∑
l∈Ij∩Im
(
(1− α)(n − 1)
n− 1− αrl
)2
V (sl) +
∑
l∈Ij∩Im
(
(1− α)(n − 1)
n− 1− αrl
)2
V (sl)
=
∑
l∈(Ij∩Im)\{i}
(
(1− α)(n − 1)
n− 1− αrl
)2
V (sl) +
∑
l∈(Ij∩Im)\{i}
(
(1− α)(n − 1)
n− 1− αrl
)2
V (sl)
+
(
(1− α)(n − 1)
n− 1− αri
)2
V (si)
(
1[i ∈ Ij ∩ Im] + 1[i ∈ Ij ∩ Im]
)
.
A similar equation holds for V (a′j − a
′
m), when the communication network is R
′.
The two communication networks R and R′ are such that (Ij ∩ Im)\{i} = (I
′
j ∩ I
′
m)\{i} and
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(Ij ∩ Im)\{i} = (I ′j ∩ I
′
m)\{i}, so for all j ∈ N and m 6= j we have:
V (a′j − a
′
m)− V (aj − am)
= ((1− α)(n − 1))2V (si)
[
1[i ∈ I ′j ∩ I
′
m] + 1[i ∈ I ′j ∩ I
′
m]
(n− 1− αr′i)
2
−
1[i ∈ Ij ∩ Im] + 1[i ∈ Ij ∩ Im]
(n− 1− αri)2
]
.
(22)
Plugging (21) and (22) into (20), we get: Uj − U
′
j =
(1− α)V (si)
(
1[i ∈ I ′j]
(
α(n − 1− r′i)
n− 1− αr′i
)2
+ 1[i ∈ I ′j]− 1[i ∈ Ij ]
(
α(n − 1− ri)
n− 1− αri
)2
− 1[i ∈ Ij]
+ α(1− α)(n − 1)
∑
m6=j
(
1[i ∈ I ′j ∩ I
′
m] + 1[i ∈ I ′j ∩ I
′
m]
(n− 1− αr′i)
2
−
1[i ∈ Ij ∩ Im] + 1[i ∈ Ij ∩ Im]
(n− 1− αri)2
) .
(23)
To evaluate the sign of Uj−U
′
j in order to know who is better off and who is worse off depending
on the communication network, we distinguish four types of players:
• (i): Players who belong both to Ri and to R
′
i. For every such player j ∈ Ri = R
′
i\{t}, we
have i ∈ Ij and i ∈ I
′
j .
• (ii): Players different from player i who belong neither to Ri nor to R
′
i. For every such player
j ∈ N\(R′i ∪ {i}) = N\(Ri ∪ {i, t}), we have i ∈ Ij and i ∈ I
′
j.
• (iii): Player t who belongs to R′i but not to Ri. For this player we have i ∈ I
′
t and i ∈ It.
• (iv): Player i, for whom we have i ∈ Ii and i ∈ I
′
i.
(i) For every player j ∈ R′i\{t}, the set of players different from j can be divided into three sets
of players: {i} ∪ (R′i\{j, t}), N\(R
′
i ∪ {i}) and {t}. We have:
• for every player m ∈ {i} ∪ (R′i\{j, t}), i ∈ Im and i ∈ I
′
m,
• for every player m ∈ N\(R′i ∪ {i}), i ∈ Im and i ∈ I
′
m,
• for player t, i ∈ It but i ∈ I
′
t.
Since i ∈ Ij, i ∈ I
′
j , and |N\(R
′
i ∪ {i})| = (n− 1− r
′
i), Equation (23) simplifies to:
Uj − U
′
j = α(1 − α)V (si)
(
(n− 1− r′i)
(n− 1− αr′i)
−
(n− 1− ri)
(n− 1− αri)
)
. (24)
Using r′i = ri + 1, we get Uj − U
′
j = −
(
α(1−α)2(n−1)
(n−1−αr′i)(n−1−αri)
)
V (si) < 0. Hence, for all j ∈ R
′
i\{t},
we have Uj < U
′
j .
(ii) For every player j ∈ N\(R′i ∪ {i}), the set of players different from j can be divided into
three sets of players: {i} ∪ (R′i\{t}), N\(R
′
i ∪ {i, j}) and {t}. We have:
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• for every player m ∈ {i} ∪ (R′i\{t}), i ∈ Im and i ∈ I
′
m,
• for every player m ∈ N\(R′i ∪ {i, j}), i ∈ Im and i ∈ I
′
m,
• for player t, i ∈ It but i ∈ I
′
t.
Since i ∈ Ij, i ∈ I ′j, and |{i} ∪ (R
′
i\{t})| = r
′
i, Equation (23) gives:
Uj − U
′
j = α(1− α)
2(n− 1)V (si)
(
r′i + 1
(n− 1− αr′i)
2
−
r′i
(n− 1− αri)2
)
. (25)
Since ri = r
′
i − 1, we have
[
r′i+1
(n−1−αr′i)
2 −
r′i
(n−1−αri)2
]
> 0. Hence, for all j ∈ N\(R′i ∪ {i}), we have
Uj > U
′
j.
(iii) The set of players different from t can be divided into two sets of players: {i} ∪ (R′i\{t})
and N\(R′i ∪ {i}). We have:
• for every player m ∈ {i} ∪ (R′i\{t}), i ∈ Im and i ∈ I
′
m,
• for every player m ∈ N\(R′i ∪ {i}), i ∈ Im and i ∈ I
′
m,
Since i ∈ It, i ∈ I
′
t, |{i} ∪ (R
′
i\{t})| = r
′
i, and |N\(R
′
i ∪ {i})| = n− 1− r
′
i, Equation (23) gives:
Ut − U
′
t = −(1− α)
2(n− 1)V (si)
(
1
n− 1− αr′i
+
α r′i
(n− 1− αri)2
)
< 0. (26)
Hence, for player t who belongs to R′i but not to Ri we have Ut < U
′
t .
(iv) The set of players different from i can be divided into three sets of players: R′i\{t}, N\(R
′
i∪
{i}) and {t}. We have:
• for every player m ∈ R′i\{t}, i ∈ Im and i ∈ I
′
m,
• for every player m ∈ N\(R′i ∪ {i}), i ∈ Im and i ∈ I
′
m,
• for player t, i ∈ It but i ∈ I
′
t.
Since i ∈ Ii, i ∈ I
′
i, and |N\(R
′
i∪{i})| = (n−1−r
′
i), Equation (23) gives exactly the same difference
as in Equation (24). Hence, for player i such that Ri = R
′
i\{t}, we have Ui < U
′
i . This completes
the proof of Proposition 1.
6.3 Proof of Proposition 2
As in the proof of Proposition 1, we consider two communication networks R = (Ri, R−i) and
R′ = (R′i, R−i) such that Ri = R
′
i\{t}. Again, player t is such that t ∈ R
′
i but t 6∈ Ri.
Ex ante expected welfare is the sum of ex ante expected utilities. When the communication
network is R′, it is given by:
W ′ =
∑
j∈R′i\{t}
U ′j +
∑
j∈N\(R′i∪{i})
U ′j + U
′
t + U
′
i .
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When the communication network is R, it is given by:
W =
∑
j∈Ri
Uj +
∑
j∈N\(Ri∪{i,t})
Uj + Ut + Ui.
Using R′i\{t} = Ri, N\(R
′
i ∪{i}) = N\(Ri ∪ {i, t}), and the fact that for all j ∈ R
′
i\{t}, Uj −U
′
j =
Ui − U
′
i , the difference W −W
′ can be written as follows:
W −W ′ =
∑
j∈{i}∪(R′i\{t})
[Uj − U
′
j ] +
∑
j∈N\(R′i∪{i})
[Uj − U
′
j ] + [Ut − U
′
t ].
We have |{i} ∪ (R′i\{t})| = r
′
i and |N\(R
′
i ∪{i})| = n− 1− r
′
i. Using equations (24), (25) and (26),
we get:
W −W ′ = α(1 − α)r′i
[
(n− 1− r′i)
(n− 1− αr′i)
−
(n− 1− ri)
(n− 1− αri)
]
V [si]
+ α(1 − α)2(n− 1)(n − 1− r′i)
[
r′i + 1
(n− 1− αr′i)
2
−
r′i
(n− 1− αri)2
]
V [si]
− (1− α)2(n− 1)
[
1
n− 1− αr′i
+
α r′i
(n− 1− αri)2
]
V [si].
After some simplifications and using the fact that r′i = ri + 1, we get:
W −W ′ = −
(1− α)3(n− 1)2V [si]
(n − 1− αr′i)
2(n − 1− αri)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
[α2(1− r′i − r
′
i
2
) + 2α(n − 1) + (n− 1)2]︸ ︷︷ ︸
x
.
Solving x = 0 in α gives the following discriminant: 4(n− 1)2(r′i + r
′
i
2) ≥ 0. We have x ≥ 0 if and
only if α ∈ [α1, α2], with α1 =
(n−1)(1−
√
r′i+r
′
i
2)
r′i+r
′
i
2−1
and α2 =
(n−1)(1+
√
r′i+r
′
i
2)
r′i+r
′
i
2−1
. From r′i ≥ 1, we deduce
that α1 < 0. From r
′
i ≤ n−1 and the fact that α2 is decreasing in r
′
i, we deduce that α2 > 1. Since
α ∈ (0, 1), x is always strictly positive. Hence, W < W ′.
6.4 Proof of Propositions 3 and 4
Consider an equilibrium of the private communication game in which each player i reveals his
type to players in Ri ⊆ N\{i}. Without loss of generality, assume that player i sends to every
player j ∈ Ri the message m
j
i = m when his type is si and the message m
j
i = m when his type
is si, and sends the same message whatever his type to players outside Ri. Given (Ri)i∈N , second
stage equilibrium actions are given by (2).
Without loss of generality, we look for the conditions under which player 1 does not deviate
from his equilibrium communication strategy above. First, assume that player 1’s true type is
s1 = s1. In equilibrium, using Equation (2), the second-stage action of every player i ∈ R1 ∪ {1} is
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given by
ai =
∑
j∈Ii\{1}
α(n − rj − 1)E(sj) + (1− α)(n − 1)sj
n− 1− αrj
+
∑
j∈Ii
E(sj) +Bi
+
α(n − r1 − 1)E(s1) + (1− α)(n − 1)s1
n− 1− αr1
, (27)
and the second-stage action of every player i /∈ R1 ∪ {1} is given by
ai =
∑
j∈Ii
α(n − rj − 1)E(sj) + (1− α)(n − 1)sj
n− 1− αrj
+
∑
j∈Ii\{1}
E(sj) +Bi + E(s1). (28)
The relevant deviations for player 1 in the communication stage consist in lying to a subset of
players M ⊆ R1, i.e., sending message m instead of m to players in M (and not deviating towards
the other players). Let m = |M |, and denote by (a′i)i∈N the profile of players’ actions after this
deviation. Every player i ∈M chooses action a′i = ai, which is given by (27) by replacing s1 by s1.
The action a′i of every player i ∈ N\(M ∪{1}) is the same as in the original equilibrium. Player 1’s
optimal action in the second stage is obtained from the best response of Equation (16) to (a′i)i6=1,
and takes the following form:
a′1 = (1− α)

 ∑
j∈I1\{1}
sj + s1 +
∑
j∈I1
E(sj) + b1

+ α
n− 1
∑
i6=1
E1(a
′
i). (29)
Using the same reasoning as the one used to get expression (18), we get:
∑
i6=1
E1(a
′
i) =
∑
j∈I1
rj
α(n− rj − 1)E(sj)
n− 1− αrj
+
∑
j∈I1
(rj + 1)
α(n − rj − 1)E(sj)
n− 1− αrj
+
∑
j∈I1\{1}
rj
(1− α)(n − 1)sj
n− 1− αrj
+
m(1− α)(n − 1)s1
n− 1− αr1
+
(r1 −m)(1− α)(n − 1)s1
n− 1− αr1
+
∑
j∈I1
(rj + 1)
(1− α)(n − 1)E(sj)
n− 1− αrj
+
∑
j∈I1
(n− 1− rj)E(sj) +
∑
j∈I1
(n− 2− rj) E(sj) +
∑
i6=1
Bi. (30)
Plugging (30) into (29), using (19) and simplifying, we get:
a′1 =
∑
j∈I1\{1}
α(n − rj − 1)E(sj) + (1− α)(n − 1)sj
n− 1− αrj
+
∑
j∈I1
E(sj) +B1
+
αm(1− α)s1 + (n− 1− αm)(1− α)s1 + α(n − r1 − 1)E(s1)
n− 1− αr1
. (31)
We denote by V1 the expected payoff of player 1 conditional to signal s1 under the original
equilibrium, and V ′1 his expected payoff conditional to signal s1 when he deviates by lying to
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players in M (and thus plays action a′1 in the second-stage game. Player 1 does not deviate by
lying to players in M if V ′1 − V1 ≤ 0. We have:
V ′1 − V1 = (1− α)E
[
(a1 −
∑
i∈N
si − b1)
2 − (a′1 −
∑
i∈N
si − b1)
2 | s1
]
+
α
n− 1
(∑
i∈M
E
[
(a1 − ai)
2 − (a′1 − ai)
2 | s1
]
+
∑
i∈R1\M
E
[
(a1 − ai)
2 − (a′1 − ai)
2 | s1
]
+
∑
i∈N\(R1∪{1})
E
[
(a1 − ai)
2 − (a′1 − ai)
2 | s1
] .
For the sake of simplicity, we examine separately the elements of the difference V ′1 −V1 and use
the following notation for i 6= 1:
zi =
∑
j∈(I1∩Ii)\{1}
(1− α)(n− 1)(sj − E(sj))
n− 1− αrj
+
∑
j∈(I1∩Ii)\{1}
(1− α)(n − 1)(E(sj)− sj)
n− 1− αrj
+B1 −Bi.
Using (27), (28) and (31) and the fact that E[zi | s1] = B1 −Bi, we get:
∑
i∈M
E
[
(a1 − ai)
2 − (a′1 − ai)
2 | s1
]
=
∑
i∈M
E
[
z2i −
(
zi +
(1− α)(n − 1− αm)(s1 − s1)
n− 1− αr1
)2∣∣∣∣∣ s1
]
= −2
(
(1− α)(n − 1− αm)(s1 − s1)
n− 1− αr1
)∑
i∈M
(B1 −Bi)−m
(
(1− α)(n − 1− αm)(s1 − s1)
n− 1− αr1
)2
.(32)
∑
i∈R1\M
E
[
(a1 − ai)
2 − (a′1 − ai)
2 | s1
]
=
∑
i∈R1\M
E
[
z2i −
(
zi −
(1− α)αm(s1 − s1)
n− 1− αr1
)2∣∣∣∣∣ s1
]
= 2
(
(1− α)αm(s1 − s1)
n− 1− αr1
) ∑
i∈R1\M
(B1 −Bi)− (r1 −m)
(
(1− α)αm(s1 − s1)
n− 1− αr1
)2
. (33)
∑
i∈N\(R1∪{1})
E
[
(a1 − ai)
2 − (a′1 − a
′
i)
2 | s1
]
=
∑
i∈N\(R1∪{1})
E
[(
zi +
(1− α)(n − 1)(s1 − E(s1))
n− 1− αr1
)2
−
(
zi +
(1− α)αms1 + (1− α)(n − 1− αm)s1 − (1− α)(n − 1)E(s1)
n− 1− αr1
)2∣∣∣∣∣ s1
]
= 2
(
(1− α)αm(s1 − s1)
n− 1− αr1
) ∑
i∈N\(R1∪{1})
(B1 −Bi) + (n− 1− r1)
(
(1− α)(n − 1)(s1 − E(s1))
n− 1− αr1
)2
− (n− 1− r1)
(
(1− α)αms1 + (1− α)(n − 1− αm)s1 − (1 − α)(n − 1)E(s1)
n− 1− αr1
)2
. (34)
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In addition, using
a¯1 − a
′
1 =
(1− α)αm(s1 − s1)
n− 1− αr1
,
and
a¯21 − a
′
1
2
=
(
α(n− r1 − 1)E(s1) + (1− α)(n − 1)s1
n− 1− αrl
)2
−
(
αm(1− α)s1 + (n− 1− αm)(1− α)s1 + α(n − r1 − 1)E(s1)
n− 1− αr1
)2
+ 2

 ∑
j∈I1\{1}
α(n − rj − 1)E(sj) + (1− α)(n − 1)sj
n− 1− αrj
+
∑
j∈I1
E(sj) +B1

((1− α)αm(s1 − s1)
n− 1− r1
)
,
we get:
E
[
(a¯1 −
∑
i∈N
si − b1)
2 − (a′1 −
∑
i∈N
si − b1)
2
∣∣∣∣∣ s1
]
= E
[
a¯21 − a
′
1
2
∣∣∣ s1]− 2E

(a¯1 − a′1)( ∑
i∈N\{1}
si + s1 + b1)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ s1


=
(
α(n− r1 − 1)E(s1) + (1− α)(n − 1)s1
n− 1− αr1
)2
+ 2 (B1 − b1 − s1)
(
(1− α)αm(s1 − s1)
n− 1− αr1
)
−
(
αm(1− α)s1 + (n− 1− αm)(1 − α)s1 + α(n − r1 − 1)E(s1)
n− 1− αr1
)2
. (35)
Next, we plug (32), (33), (34) and (35) into V ′1 − V1 and simplify. To simplify the part of the
difference V ′1 − V1 that deals with biases, one should note that:
B1 −Bi =
(1− α)(n − 1)(b1 − bi)
n+ α− 1
and B1 − b1 =
−α(n− 1)b1 +
∑
j 6=1 bj
n+ α− 1
.
Finally, we get:
V ′1 − V1 =
2α(1 − α)2(n− 1)(s1 − s1)
(n+ α− 1)(n − 1− αr1)
(∑
i∈M
bi −mb1
)
−
α(1 − α)2m(n− 1− αm)(s1 − s1)
2
(n − 1− αr1)2
.
Hence, in the private communication game, player 1 of type s1 = s1 does not deviate by lying to
players in M ⊆ R1 if V
′
1 − V1 ≤ 0, i.e.,
−
(
b1 −
∑
i∈M bi
m
)
≤
(n− 1 + α)(n − 1− αm)
2(n − 1)(n − 1− αr1)
(s1 − s1). (36)
Applying the same reasoning, player 1 of type s1 = s1 has no profitable deviation if, for all
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M ⊆ R1, the following condition holds:
b1 −
∑
i∈M bi
m
≤
(n − 1 + α)(n − 1− αm)
2(n − 1)(n − 1− αr1)
(s1 − s1). (37)
Condition (3) is obtained from (36) and (37).
In a group R¯-communication game, every player i is required to send the same message to
all players in R¯i. Consider an equilibrium in which player 1 sends to all the players in R¯1 the
message m1 = m when his type is s1 and the message m1 = m when his type is s1. The only
possible deviation for player 1 in the communication stage consists in lying to all the players in
R¯1, i.e., sending the message m instead of m to all the players in R¯1. Therefore, condition (3)
for R′1 = R1 = R¯1 is the condition under which player 1 does not deviate from his equilibrium
communication strategy above in the group R¯-communication game.
6.5 Proof of Proposition 5
When types are fully certifiable, the simplest way to support a fully revealing equilibrium is to
consider the communication strategy profile in which every player completely certifies his type to
all the other players whatever his type. That is, σi(si) = ci(si) for all i ∈ N and si ∈ Si in the
public communication game, and σji (si) = ci(si) for all i ∈ N , j 6= i and si ∈ Si in the private
communication game, where ci(si) ∈ Mi is such that M
−1
i (ci(si)) = {si}. When such strategies
are used in the first stage, then each player knows the state θ in the decision stage, so the second
stage equilibrium actions are given by Equation (12).
We prove the existence of a fully revealing equilibrium in the public and private communication
games separately.
• Public Communication. We start from a fully revealing communication strategy profile
σi(si) = ci(si) for all i ∈ N and si ∈ Si, and consider a deviation by player i to a message
mi 6= ci(si) when his type is si. To support this equilibrium, we consider the degenerate com-
mon belief µij(mi) = µ
i(mi) = max{ti ∈ Si : mi ∈ Mi(ti)} for every j 6= i when bi ≤ b, and
µij(mi) = µ
i(mi) = min{ti ∈ Si : mi ∈ Mi(ti)} for every j 6= i when bi ≥ b. By Equation (11), a
sufficient condition for player i’s deviation not to be profitable is that for all s−i ∈ S−i,[
ai(a−i(θ(µ
i(mi), s−i)); θ(s))
]2
−
α
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
[
aj(θ(µ
i(mi), s−i))
]2
≤ [ai(a−i(θ(s)); θ(s))]
2 −
α
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
[aj(θ(s))]
2.
(38)
Given player i’s best response (10), this is equivalent to
[
(1− α)(θ + bi) +
α
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
aj(θ(µ
i(mi), s−i))
]2
−
α
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
[
aj(θ(µ
i(mi), s−i))
]2
≤
[
(1− α)(θ + bi) +
α
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
aj(θ(s))
]2
−
α
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
[aj(θ(s))]
2.
(39)
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By replacing the equilibrium action of every player j 6= i given by Equation (12) in the last
inequality we get (after some simplifications):
[
θ(µi(mi), s−i)− θ(s)
][
θ(s)− θ(µi(mi), s−i) + 2
(n− 1)bi −
∑
j 6=i bj
n+ α− 1
]
≤ 0. (40)
Since θ(s) is increasing in si, a sufficient condition for this inequality to be satisfied is µ
i(mi) =
max{ti ∈ Si : mi ∈Mi(ti)} when bi ≤ b, and µ
i(mi) = min{ti ∈ Si : mi ∈Mi(ti)} when bi ≥ b.
• Private Communication. We start from a fully revealing communication strategy profile
σji (si) = ci(si) for all i ∈ N , j 6= i and si ∈ Si, and consider a deviation by player i to a
vector of messages mi 6= (ci(si), . . . , ci(si)) when his type is si. To support this equilibrium, we
consider the degenerate private beliefs µij(m
j
i ) = max{ti ∈ Si : m
j
i ∈ Mi(ti)} when bi ≤ bj, and
µij(m
j
i ) = min{ti ∈ Si : m
j
i ∈Mi(ti)} when bi ≥ bj .
The analogue of Equation (39) for the private communication game is:
[
(1− α)(θ + bi) +
α
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
aj(θ(µ
i
j(m
j
i ), s−i))
]2
−
α
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
[
aj(θ(µ
i
j(m
j
i ), s−i))
]2
≤
[
(1− α)(θ + bi) +
α
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
aj(θ(s))
]2
−
α
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
[aj(θ(s))]
2,
(41)
i.e., by (12),
[
(1− α)θ +
α
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
θ(µij(m
j
i ), s−i) +Bi
]2
−
[
θ +Bi
]2
+
α
n− 1
[∑
j 6=i
θ2 − (θ(µij(m
j
i ), s−i))
2
+ 2Bj(θ − θ(µ
i
j(m
j
i ), s−i))
]
≤ 0.
Letting
T ≡
( α
n− 1
)2(∑
j 6=i
θ(µij(m
j
i ), s−i)
)2
+
2α(1 − α)
n− 1
θ
∑
j 6=i
θ(µij(m
j
i ), s−i)
−
α
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
[θ(µij(m
j
i ), s−i)]
2
− α(1− α)θ2,
the condition further simplifies to
T + 2αθ
(∑
j 6=i bj + αbi
n+ α− 1
−Bi
)
+
2α
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
θ(µij(m
j
i ), s−i)(Bi −Bj) ≤ 0
⇔ T +
2α(1 − α)
n+ α− 1
∑
j 6=i
[
bi − bj
][
θ(µij(m
j
i ), s−i)− θ
]
≤ 0.
By the construction of players’ beliefs, and since θ(s) is increasing in si, we have[
bi − bj
][
θ(µij(m
j
i ), s−i)− θ
]
≤ 0, for all j 6= i.
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Finally, to show that the condition for no deviation is satisfied, it suffices to remark that T is always
negative. Indeed, solving T = 0 in θ gives the following discriminant:
4α2(1− α)
(n− 1)2
(
[
∑
j 6=i
θ(µij(m
j
i ), s−i)]
2
− (n− 1)
∑
j 6=i
[θ(µij(m
j
i ), s−i)]
2)
,
which can be checked to be always negative.15
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